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31 
WHICH REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION? 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Jack M. Balkin2 
I. RANDY BARNETT, MEET INIGO MONTOYA 
Reading Randy Barnett’s new book Our Republican 
Constitution,3 one feels like Inigo Montoya in The Princess Bride: 
“You keep using that word, ‘republican.’ I do not think it means 
what you think it means.” Randy Barnett and I agree that we have 
a republican constitution. The problem is that we disagree about 
what that entails. 
Barnett’s Republican Constitution has relatively little to do 
with the historical tradition of republicanism, a tradition that 
celebrates the common good; seeks to inculcate civic virtue; 
opposes aristocracy, oligarchy, and corruption; understands 
liberty not as mere negative freedom but as non-domination; 
connects civil rights to civic duties; and demands a government 
that derives its powers from and is ultimately responsive to the 
great body of the people. 
In fact, Barnett’s “republicanism” is far closer to what most 
historians of the Founding era would regard as the opposite or 
complement of the republican tradition. This is the tradition of 
natural rights liberalism, which begins with John Locke and 
evolves into classical liberalism in the nineteenth century. This 
tradition celebrates individual autonomy, views the state as 
 
 1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. 
 2. Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law 
School. My thanks to Sanford Levinson for comments on a previous draft. 
 3. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
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organized to protect the natural rights of individuals, fears the 
tyranny of majorities, and treats liberty as a negative freedom—a 
protected space in which individuals, free from state control, may 
accumulate property and pursue happiness (pp. 49-50). 
The classical liberal tradition is an important part of the 
American political tradition; but it is not the republican tradition. 
The American political tradition is a blend of liberal and 
republican ideals, which reappear in ever new guises as historical 
circumstances and political alliances change. Barnett has 
obscured the historical republican tradition by lifting the term and 
applying it to its opposite number. In fact, Barnett’s vision of Our 
Republican Constitution is perhaps closest to an idealization of 
the classical liberal constitution of the late nineteenth century, 
which combined dual federalism with police powers 
jurisprudence.4 
This late nineteenth-century version of classical liberalism is 
the hero of Barnett’s story. Every hero needs an adversary to 
compete with, and so Barnett constructs an opposite tradition, 
which he calls the Democratic Constitution; it seems to be an 
amalgam of Rousseau and early twentieth-century progressivism. 
Barnett pronounces our true Constitution to be the Republican 
(i.e., classical liberal) version. Barnett concedes that the 
Democratic Constitution is part of our history, but argues that it 
is not the best and truest version of our political selves. The 
Democratic Constitution (i.e., progressivism) is actually 
inconsistent with the basic premises of the American 
constitutional order. Indeed, as Barnett shows us—more in 
sorrow than in anger—following the perfection of the 
constitutional system in the nineteenth century, the Democratic 
Constitution has been ascendant. As a result, things have tended 
to fall apart, leading to the depredations of the New Deal, the 
Administrative State, and the Welfare State. To redeem Our 
Republican Constitution, we must remedy the fall that came in 
 
 4. On police powers jurisprudence, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 
(1993) (describing the late nineteenth-century attempt to distinguish laws that served the 
public interest in health, safety, and welfare from laws that imposed unjustified special 
burdens or benefits or otherwise had secretly redistributive purposes). The classic 
treatment of dual federalism is Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (1950) (describing the nineteenth-century model of distinct competences of 
federal and state regulatory authority, which largely operated in separate spheres). 
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the early twentieth century. We must renounce progressivism and 
all its works. 
The disagreement between Barnett and me about the 
meaning of republicanism is not merely semantic. By taking the 
word “republican” and pasting it onto the classical liberal 
tradition, he has buried a truly important tradition in American 
constitutional thought—the actual historical republican tradition, 
which is not the same as Barnett’s “Democratic Constitution.” 
The historical republican tradition crosscuts Barnett’s opposition 
between Republican and Democratic Constitutions, and includes 
features of both. More to the point, the historical republican 
tradition is especially relevant today, and it stands as a valuable 
critique of the limitations of late nineteenth-century classical 
liberalism. 
In saying this, however, I am not advocating that we simply 
ignore the lessons of Barnett’s book and hew to the historical 
republican tradition. Like the classical liberal tradition, the 
historical republican tradition is flawed and compromised in its 
historical context. Only some parts of these two traditions are 
worth preserving and bringing forward into the present. 
Classical liberals have often been too complacent about 
threats to republics that stem from inequalities of wealth and 
coercive aspects of market economies. The historical tradition of 
republicanism, by contrast, insisted that economic self-sufficiency 
was central to participation in republican government. This 
demand, however, produced both conservative and egalitarian 
versions of republicanism. 
Conservative versions of republicanism sought to limit 
political freedoms to those (male) heads of households who were 
not dependent on others and therefore were free to pursue the 
public good. This excluded women, slaves, and persons who did 
not own much property. In fact, older and more conservative 
versions of republicanism, while opposing hierarchies or 
distinctions of rank among male heads of households, were either 
complacent about or actually defended hierarchies within 
households.5 These versions of republicanism assumed that in 
order for men to be independent and self-governing, they had to 
 
 5. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1668 (1998) 
(“Patriarchy was comfortably compatible with classical republicanism: the head of the 
family represented the family (and its servants and slaves) in its relationship to the state.”). 
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be supported by women, slaves, and servants who were 
economically dependent on them. A similar argument justified 
property qualifications for the suffrage—if landless workers were 
dependent on their employers, they would simply vote their 
employers’ interests and would fail to promote the public good.6 
The egalitarian version of republicanism, by contrast, has 
argued that government should work to dismantle hierarchies of 
domination and dependence. Government should create the 
conditions for a broad base of middle-class voters who are 
financially independent and therefore could rule themselves. 
These were the ambitions of the founders of the nineteenth-
century Republican Party, who sought both to eliminate slavery 
and to secure the conditions of economic self-sufficiency for a 
broad base of the public.7 The egalitarian strand of republicanism 
was influenced by liberalism, because liberalism has historically 
been willing to disrupt and transform existing social arrangements 
in order to realize the freedom and equality of individuals.8 It is 
this egalitarian version of republicanism, together with the liberal 
tradition of respect for individual dignity and freedom, that we 
should carry forward with us into the present. 
My disagreement with Barnett is not a disagreement about 
the importance of natural law and liberalism to the American 
 
 6. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815, at 8–9 (2009). 
 7. See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal 
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 38–40 (1990) (describing exclusionary and 
inclusionary versions of republicanism, and identifying the inclusionary version with the 
early Republican Party). Nevertheless, inegalitarian features of republican ideology were 
present even here. As Hendrik Hartog has pointed out, “Because of their republican 
inheritance,” the members of the early Republican Party “could not imagine how to 
accomplish th[e] enfranchisement [of blacks] without constituting black men as possessors 
of domains of women and children, without making freedmen into ‘householders.’” 
Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 81 
(1987). 
 8. That is why republicans can no more do without liberalism than liberals can do 
without republicanism. To counteract the conservative and preservationist tendencies of 
republicanism, egalitarians have drawn on critical features of the liberal tradition, which 
emphasizes the equal freedom of every individual and the transformation of social 
relations to achieve this end. See Kerber, supra note 5, at 1669 (“When Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and her colleagues wanted to demand a place in the republican polity, republican 
discourse helped them little. To sustain the proposition that all are created free, equal, and 
independent, they needed Locke, not Machiavelli.”); see also Hartog, supra note 7, at 82 
(arguing that in embracing the republican tradition, one should not forget “the 
disruptiveness and transformative characteristics that are a part of a liberal constitutional 
tradition”). 
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constitutional tradition. My point, rather, is that by emphasizing 
the classical liberal tradition to the exclusion of the historical 
republican tradition, he has given us an impoverished account of 
American constitutionalism. The American constitutional 
tradition, understood in its best sense, has always drawn on 
elements of both the republican and liberal traditions, and applied 
them to the problems and circumstances of the present. It has 
employed the best parts of each tradition to critique and 
transcend the blindnesses and limitations of the other. That is as 
true of the Founding period as it is of the present. No 
reconstruction of the American constitutional tradition can afford 
to discard one-half of this dialectic. 
Our Republican Constitution, however, is not written as—or 
intended to be—a historical tome. It is an argument about 
present-day constitutionalism directed to a popular audience. For 
that reason, it might make sense for Barnett to write this book in 
the way he has, labeling the classical liberal tradition he celebrates 
as “Republican.” The reasons, however, have little to do with 
historical fidelity, and everything to do with how Barnett 
imagined we would structure debates about the direction of the 
Constitution and the country in the near future. 
When Barnett set down to write this book, fresh from his 
partial victory in the Health Care Case,9 libertarians and 
constitutional conservatives might have hoped that the 
contemporary Republican Party might finally come to its senses. 
It might embrace Barnett’s constitutional ideas about limited 
government in order to hold off the forces of progressive social 
democracy championed by the Democratic Party (p. 10). But, to 
everyone’s amazement, the terms of political debate have shifted 
radically in the interim. In the world we now inhabit, the argument 
of Barnett’s book risks being shoved rudely aside. The only 
political party that might embrace his ideas about the 
Constitution has descended into internal bickering and has been 
captured by a demagogue, the very sort of demagogue the 
Founders warned us about. Before the Republican Party can 
embrace Our Republican Constitution, it must first fight off the 
populist insurgency within its own ranks. The irony then, is that a 
book written to intervene in a contemporary debate about the 
 
 9. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Constitution may be most important for a political future whose 
contours are still uncertain. 
II. BARNETT’S REPUBLICANISM 
What does Barnett mean by a republican constitution? First, 
Barnett’s republicanism is the opposite of direct democracy and 
simple majority rule. It embraces an individual conception of 
popular sovereignty in which each and every one of us is a 
sovereign (p. 23). It opposes a collective conception of popular 
sovereignty, which, Barnett believes, leads to the view that the 
government should respect the will of the majority (pp. 97, 126). 
The problem with majority rule is that majorities always threaten 
to violate the rights of individuals or minority groups. When 
majorities do not respect rights, they are little more than a faction 
in control of government (pp. 56, 97). 
Second, the purpose of government is to protect the natural 
rights of individuals. Natural rights preexist government and 
governments are instituted for their protection (pp. 23, 41-44). 
They include the right to acquire and possess property, to choose 
a calling, and to pursue happiness (pp. 24, 25, 33, 39, 66-69, 107). 
Natural rights are negative liberties against majority compulsion. 
When government secures natural rights, they create a space in 
which people may pursue their own visions of happiness (pp. 49-
50). 
In order to protect natural rights, it is not enough to 
enumerate rights. The enumeration of rights is no more than a 
fail-safe to prevent the worst excesses of majority tyranny (pp. 
167-168). To prevent majorities from behaving like factions, we 
must impose structural limits on government, through devices 
such as the separation of powers and federalism (pp. 167-171). 
Third, one should never confuse what government officials 
do with some Rousseau-ian fantasy of “the Will of the People.” 
Government officials are not the people. They are merely 
servants or agents of the people and they must always exercise 
their agency consistent with their duty to protect natural rights 
(pp. 22-23). The point of a constitution is to govern the agents who 
govern the people. 
These considerations apply with special force to judges, who 
have an important role to play in a constitutional republic. Judges 
must exercise judicial review to ensure that laws and executive 
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actions do not overstep the just powers of government and violate 
people’s natural rights. Judicial review is not simply a power—it 
is the duty of judges to ensure that government agents adhere to 
limits on government (p. 25, 128). Therefore courts should not 
assume that legislation is constitutional, as they often do. Instead 
of a presumption of constitutionality, courts should engage in a 
presumption of liberty (p. 243). They should ask whether a law 
unduly limits liberty, regardless of whether the liberties affected 
are specifically enumerated in the Constitution (pp. 244-245). 
Liberty is not simply a collection of enumerated rights; it is the 
very purpose of government, and courts should stand ready to 
hold government officials to account and require them to explain 
why restraints on liberty are justified. It follows that judicial 
restraint is not a virtue. It is an abdication of the duty of judges to 
enforce constitutional limits that are necessary to protect 
individuals’ natural rights (pp. 24, 225, 245). 
Barnett identifies each of these positions with the Founders. 
They believed that the purpose of government was to secure 
natural rights, and they had experienced the excesses of 
democracy in the period immediately following the American 
Revolution. In order to secure individuals’ natural rights, they 
created the Constitution’s system of federalism, separation of 
powers, and checks and balances. These structural features—and 
not the enumeration of specific rights—were the most important 
devices for securing liberty from the tyranny of majority factions 
(pp. 209-210). 
To be sure, the Founders accepted slavery, and this was a 
defect in the original conception of the Constitution. But this 
defect was cured by the adoption of the Reconstruction 
Amendments (pp. 60-61). With the adoption of these 
amendments in the nineteenth century, Our Republican 
Constitution was completed as a vehicle for the defense of 
individual natural rights.10 The only question was whether 
Americans could keep such a republic. In Barnett’s view, the 
country failed miserably during the Progressive Era and the New 
Deal, and despite occasional successes, the failures have only 
accumulated. 
 
 10. BARNETT p. 62 (“[T]he text of the Constitution was amended by a new 
Republican Party to complete our Republican Constitution.”). 
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III. WHAT KIND OF ARGUMENT IS BARNETT 
MAKING? 
Although Barnett quotes the Founders at many points in the 
book, his argument is not really an argument about the original 
meaning of the Constitution. At least, it is not an argument from 
original meaning according to Barnett’s own theory of how to 
interpret the Constitution. That theory distinguishes between 
discovering the original communicative content of the 
Constitution—the task of constitutional interpretation—and 
constitutional “constructions,” which fill out, make sense of, and 
apply the constitutional text.11 
Much of the argument of the book is not constitutional 
interpretation in the sense described above, because it is not an 
exegesis of the original communicative content of the text of the 
Constitution. In fact, the document on which Barnett lavishes the 
most attention is the Declaration of Independence, and he takes 
us through several of its key passages with a focus that is almost 
Talmudic in its attentions. Barnett uses the Declaration to 
elaborate what he regards as the essential ethos of the 
Constitution. According to Barnett’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation, this argument is a construction of the 
Constitution—albeit the best and most appropriate construction. 
Similarly, his “presumption of liberty” is not an account of the 
original communicative content of the Constitution’s text. Rather, 
it is an important construction directed at judges and designed to 
fulfill the Constitution’s larger purposes.12 
Nor is Barnett really making an argument about original 
intentions. His account of history is deliberately schematic and it 
picks and chooses certain features of the thought of the Founders, 
while leaving many others out—including, most notably, elements 
that reflect the actual republican tradition. It is also a telltale sign 
that Barnett spends so much effort expounding the Declaration, 
which is not part of the Constitution. (Like many scholars, 
including myself, he nevertheless believes that the Declaration 
 
 11. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–130 (2004) (distinguishing between interpretation and 
construction); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of the New Originalism, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 412, 419–20 (2013) (same); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011) (same). 
 12. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 11, at 70 (“[A] ‘presumption 
of liberty’ that places the burden on the government to justify its restrictions on liberty as 
necessary and proper. . . . is a constitutional construction.”). 
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should serve as the Constitution’s guiding star.) Barnett collapses 
different groups of people and different generations together and 
speaks of the Founders as a single entity with a single 
consciousness. This rhetorical practice signals that he engaged in 
a special kind of argument that is not well captured by the 
conventional categories of original intention or original 
meaning.13 It is, however, a very common style of argument in 
American law and politics. 
What kind of argument is Barnett making then? Understood 
in its best light, his book is an argument about the ethos of the 
Constitution and about the American political tradition. In my 
categorization of historical modalities of argument, it is an 
argument from ethos and from political tradition, which draws on 
examples of the thought and actions of honored authorities during 
the Founding, the Antebellum Era, and Reconstruction.14 Such 
arguments are often treated as “originalist” in a broad sense, and 
they sometimes look like arguments from original meaning or 
original intention. But they have a special quality. 
First, they are often narrative arguments that offer a broad 
perspective on history. To show us what he means by a 
Republican Constitution, Barnett takes us from the American 
Revolution through the twentieth century. 
Second, these arguments marry the descriptive and the 
normative through the use of storytelling. Through appeals to 
selected statements and moments from the past, these arguments 
explain the kinds of values that Americans have been committed 
to and should be committed to. 
Third, arguments from ethos and political tradition inevitably 
simplify history because the values of a tradition have not always 
been embraced or fully put into effect. It is always possible to list 
many examples—and indeed entire periods—in which the 
tradition’s values are not honored. For example, governments 
have not always protected natural rights or the equality of 
persons, and Barnett would argue that this is true of much of 
contemporary American governance. But when Americans have 
 
 13. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 641, 677 (2013) (“Arguments that appeal to the Founders or the Framers as an 
undifferentiated whole, or that conflate different generations (revolutionaries, Framers, 
politicians of the early federal period) are likely to be arguments from tradition or ethos.”). 
 14. Id. at 676–87 (describing arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored 
authority). 
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been true to their traditions, Barnett would say, they have 
protected natural rights and equality. Thus, arguments from ethos 
and political tradition select strands of history that best reflect the 
most valuable features of our history and assert that these strands 
reflect the true or authentic practices of the tradition, even if they 
have been honored in the breach as much as in the observance. 
Fourth, because these arguments are narrative in conception, 
they trace the history of ideas through the clash of peoples and 
groups. Some of these people are the heroes of the story, and their 
opponents are people we are supposed to root against.15 
Accordingly, Barnett constructs a counter-tradition, which 
he calls the Democratic Constitution. He argues that this 
tradition, although present throughout American history, does 
not reflect the truest and best parts of our tradition. To some 
extent we have even been led astray by this tradition. Barnett 
generally identifies this tradition with persons and groups he does 
not particularly admire, like the Jacksonians who apologized for 
slavery, Woodrow Wilson, and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.16 
He especially identifies it with progressives in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Progressives treated rights as an 
object of democratic deliberation and majority control. They 
denied natural rights or argued that they had to give way to the 
requirements of the common good. 
Arguments from ethos and tradition inevitably simplify 
history, because these arguments use history to show us what is 
most valuable. They are didactic rather than merely descriptive. 
For this reason, these arguments inevitably pick out heroes and 
villains, people to root for and people to root against. In Barnett’s 
account, the heroes of our constitutional tradition are the 
Founders, the abolitionists, and the founders of the Republican 
Party. Their modern heirs, he insists, are classical liberals and 
libertarians. The villains (or at least adversaries) in the story are 
the defenders of slavery, Jacksonian Democrats, the Progressives, 
the defenders of the New Deal, and liberals. Their contemporary 
heirs are political progressives and liberals in the Democratic 
Party, and majoritarian conservatives in the Republican Party. 
 
 15. Id. at 684–85 (describing strategies of selective identification and dis-
identification in arguments from ethos and tradition). 
 16. BARNETT p. 89 (apologists for slavery); pp. 136–37 (Wilson), 138–44 (Holmes). 
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It is true that most of the followers of the “Republican 
Constitution” find themselves in the contemporary Republican 
Party, and most of the adherents of the “Democratic 
Constitution” find themselves in the contemporary Democratic 
Party. But this, Barnett insists, is merely an accident of history, 
because some conservative Republicans also argue for 
majoritarianism and judicial restraint. Conversely, some 
Democrats believe in strong judicial review to protect (some) 
natural rights, although, unfortunately, not on questions of 
national power and economic regulation (pp. 18-19). 
Because Barnett is not making an argument from original 
intention or original meaning in a technical sense, criticizing him 
for failure to make these arguments correctly misses the point of 
his argument.17 To take arguments from ethos and tradition 
seriously on their own terms, one must recognize that these 
arguments obtain their normative weight from interpretations of 
the past premised on a narrative about the history and trajectory 
of the nation. It follows that the most appropriate way to respond 
to arguments from ethos and political tradition is to: (1) 
complicate the narrative; (2) offer counter-narratives and 
counter-traditions that better describe the nation’s values and 
path; and (3) show how a fuller account of history suggests 
different normative lessons.18 
That is why the question of whether Barnett is correctly using 
the term “republican” is not and should not be merely a semantic 
dispute. The real question is whether he has adequately captured 
the traditions of American constitutional thought from which he 
wishes to draw normative conclusions, and whether a fuller 
account of history would point to different normative 
commitments. 
As I noted in the introduction, Barnett has misdescribed an 
important tradition in American political thought that is properly 
called republican. Although he borrows a few strands from that 
tradition, his account is better described as the opposite or the 
complement of the republican tradition—the tradition of classical 
liberalism. This version of liberalism flowers in the late nineteenth 
 
 17. Balkin, supra note 13, at 678–82 (explaining that arguments of this type simplify 
historical narratives for presentist, didactic purposes). 
 18. Id. at 689 (arguing that critiques of arguments from ethos and political tradition 
“offer counternarratives. . . . complicate history. . . .[and] draw competing normative 
lessons from history”). 
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century in theories of dual federalism and police powers 
jurisprudence designed to preserve individual liberty, and 
especially economic liberty.  
Although Barnett identifies his theory with the Founders, it 
is really a sympathetic restatement of late nineteenth-century 
(and early twentieth-century) classical liberalism. He reads the 
nineteenth century back onto the eighteenth, making it more 
classically liberal—and less republican—than it actually was. 
Conversely, his “Democratic Constitution” is really a restatement 
of early twentieth-century progressivism which arises in 
opposition to the Gilded Age. He reads progressive ideas back 
into the eighteenth century to construct the historical adversary 
of his favored account of the Constitution. 
In short, the opposition that Barnett wants to draw between 
the Republican and Democratic Constitutions is really a 
schematic or idealized version of the struggle between classical 
liberalism and progressivism at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This is an important clash of values, and it had 
momentous consequences for the way we understand 
constitutional law today. But this struggle is not really a 
Founding-era tension in the way that Barnett portrays it. It is 
about two different interpretations of the Founding offered over 
a century later, by people who found themselves in what I call 
constitutional modernity—facing a world very different from the 
Founders and asking what the correct way forward should be.19 
At the turn of the twentieth century, classical liberals and 
progressives took very different lessons from the past. 
Progressives saw a Constitution increasingly unable to deal with 
plutocracy. The Civil War had taught them that our constitutional 
system could fail and had failed. They were therefore drawn to 
constitutional reform, leading to a series of constitutional 
amendments during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century. Classical liberals, drawing on Jacksonian and abolitionist 
ideas of free labor and natural rights, increasingly identified the 
Constitution with judicial protection of economic liberties and 
they developed constitutional doctrines to protect these rights.20 
Barnett’s book is less an account of the actual values of the 
 
 19. On constitutional modernity and responses to it, see Jack M. Balkin, Why Are 
Americans Originalist?, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL (David Schiff & Richard Nobles eds., 2014). 
 20. See GILLMAN, supra note 4. 
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Founders than an account of one interpretation of the 
constitutional tradition, designed to deal with problems of 
modernity, and developed a century after the Founders. 
At various points in his narrative Barnett lumps modern 
liberals together with progressives.21 This is somewhat unfair. 
Although many of the heirs of progressivism are called liberals 
today, modern liberalism—at least the mid to late twentieth-
century version—is actually a synthesis of classical liberalism and 
progressivism. Modern liberals agreed with classical liberals that 
government must protect both enumerated and unenumerated 
rights and that judges must enforce these rights. To this day 
liberals and libertarians often agree about many civil liberties 
issues. Modern liberals broke from classical liberalism, however, 
on issues of economic and property rights, and on the scope of 
federal power.22 Here they borrowed from the progressive 
critique of classical liberalism. Modern liberals continued to 
believe that the purpose of government was to secure the rights 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But modern liberals 
argued that in economic circumstances completely different from 
the Founding, it was necessary to regulate markets and property 
to give ordinary people as well as wealthy people a genuine shot 
at pursuing happiness. Similarly, modern liberals took from the 
Whigs and the early Republican Party the lesson that federal 
power was necessary to promote economic development and 
economic opportunity, and that the federal government should 
invest in infrastructure and public goods to achieve these ends. By 
contrast, late nineteenth-century classical liberals increasingly 
rejected the views of the Whigs and the early Republican Party on 
federal power; they embraced what were essentially Jacksonian 
ideas about formal equality of opportunity and Jacksonian 
arguments for limited national power. Barnett must omit these 
details from his narrative because they complicate his central 
 
 21. See p. 129 (noting that by 1929, “Progressives . . . were calling themselves 
liberals”). 
 22. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF HOPE AND THE 
BITTER HERITAGE: AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 89 (2007) (noting the 
redefinition of liberalism to meet the needs of the early twentieth century); DAVID E. 
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 55 (2011) (“Modern ‘liberal’ constitutional jurisprudence, rather 
than being descended solely from the ideas of early-twentieth century Progressive jurists, 
is a synthesis of Progressive fondness for government regulation, and the classical liberal 
. . . support for individual rights and skepticism of government power.”). 
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point that the founders of the Republican Party were heroes 
because they ended slavery and sought to protect natural rights. 
But they did so by rejecting not only Jacksonian ideas about 
slavery but also Jacksonian conceptions of limited federal power. 
IV. WHAT IS THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION? 
As I have noted, Barnett’s account of republicanism would 
be unrecognizable to historians of the republican tradition in the 
United States. In fact, in many ways it is the opposite or 
complement of what historians would call the republican 
tradition. This section explains why. 
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s historians of the American 
Revolution began a revival of the republican tradition in 
American politics and constitutionalism. The key players were 
Bernard Bailyn,23 J.G.A. Pocock,24 and Gordon Wood,25 and they 
developed what came to be known as the Republican Synthesis.26 
They argued that the Founding generation owed as much to the 
ideas of James Harrington, Baron de Montesquieu and “Country 
Party” ideology, as they did to the work of John Locke and the 
liberal tradition of natural rights. The latter tradition is the 
ancestor of the classical liberal tradition that Barnett mislabels as 
“republican.”  
These historians did not agree in all respects—Pocock, for 
example, emphasized the influence of Niccolo Machiavelli and 
the classical humanist tradition. But together they pointed to a 
vibrant tradition of republicanism that played an important role 
in Founding-era thought. Scholars like Joyce Appleby,27 Isaac 
 
 23. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1968). 
 24. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). 
 25. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991); 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). 
 26. See Robert Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an 
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 
(1972); see also LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A 
PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); Robert Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American 
Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982). 
 27. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE 
REPUBLICANISM OF THE 1790S (1984) (arguing that Jefferson’s commitments to agrarian 
capitalism and free trade made him as liberal as he was republican); JOYCE APPLEBY, 
LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992). 
3 - BALKIN_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17 8:51 AM 
2017] WHICH REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION? 45 
 
Kramnick,28 and John Patrick Diggins,29 critiqued the civic 
republican historians. They pointed out that the Founders held 
both liberal and republican ideals, and that their ideas constantly 
evolved as they confronted the growth of commercial society and 
the problems of governing the new republic.30 During the 1980s 
and 1990s, when Barnett and I began our academic careers, the 
law reviews were full of discussions of the civic republican 
tradition and its potential relevance to American constitutional 
law.31 
Today most historians believe that the Founding era was a 
pragmatic mix of both republican and liberal themes and that this 
ideological mixture was continually evolving throughout the 
Revolution and the early years of the republic.32 Liberalism 
increasingly dominates as America moved into the nineteenth 
century, but republican ideas—like belief in the public good, 
opposition to oligarchy, and concerns about political corruption—
have always remained in the American political and constitutional 
tradition. We can find different elements of republicanism on 
both sides of key political controversies, like those between 
Federalists and Jeffersonians, Whigs and Jacksonians, early 
Republicans and post-bellum Democrats, and so on into the 
present. Indeed, many republican themes appear in political 
discourse on both the left and the right today. When both left and 
 
 28. Issac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629 (1982) 
(emphasizing the importance of Lockean liberalism in the Founding); ISSAC KRAMNICK, 
REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1990) (same). 
 29. JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984) 
(emphasizing the influence of Locke and Calvinism and arguing that republicanism is a 
surface gloss on a deeper liberal political tradition). 
 30. See also Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. 
HIST. 11 (1992) (examining and critiquing the Republican Synthesis as a Kuhnian research 
paradigm); RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CIVIC VIRTUE (1992) (pointing out that eighteenth-century 
liberalism included many features of civic republicanism, and vice-versa). 
 31. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 
(1992); Symposium, Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional Order, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3 (1990); Symposium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican 
Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 1 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); 
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Morton J. 
Horowitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). 
 32. Alan Gibson, Ancients, Moderns and Americans: The Republicanism-Liberalism 
Debate Revisited, 21 HIST. POL. THEORY 261, 261–62 (2000). 
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right argue that Washington is corrupt, that government has been 
taken over by an elite oligarchy and that the little guy can’t catch 
a break, they are summoning elements of the republican tradition. 
What are the themes of the historical republican tradition? 
We might identify seven of them.33 
First, the framers opposed republicanism not merely to direct 
popular rule, but also to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy.34 
In the American version of republicanism, a republic is an anti-
monarchical, anti-aristocratic, and anti-oligarchical form of 
government.35 
Second, republicanism requires that citizens must work for 
the public good. A republic is a res publica, a “public thing,” or 
the “public good,” and citizens have a duty to further and defend 
 
 33. The description of republican themes in the next nine paragraphs is drawn from 
Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1427, 
1432–37 (2016). 
 34. Thus, when Barnett quotes Richard Beeman as noting that all of the Founders 
were republicans, see p. 27 (quoting RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION xi (2009)), Beeman is actually emphasizing 
the Founders’ opposition to monarchy and aristocracy as much as their opposition to direct 
democracy. See. e.g., Beeman, supra, at xi–xii (arguing that “the vast majority of the 
Founding Fathers” were republicans because “they had rejected monarchy and hereditary 
rule and had embraced unequivocally the idea of representative government,” although 
they differed on the nature of representation); id. at 81 (“In the wake of their revolution 
against monarchical rule, all Americans embraced the idea that legislatures—composed of 
representatives answerable to the people—were the heart and soul of any system of truly 
‘republican’ government); id. at 122 (noting that at the time of the Founding, “republican” 
meant opposition to “hereditary monarchy” and support for “some form of representative 
government,” but not “unmediated democracy”) (emphasis in original); id. at 344–45 
(noting that the American Revolution was not only waged against “a tyrannical King and 
Parliament,” but was “also a struggle of virtue against vice, of republican simplicity against 
the dissipation that extravagance of frivolity inevitably encouraged”); id. at 412 (arguing 
that the 1787 Constitution “was in many respects unmistakably republican” in that “[i]t 
emphatically rejected notions of hereditary monarchy and aristocracy” while “stopping 
well-short” of democracy). 
 35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (“It is essential to [republican] 
government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an 
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, 
exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of 
republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.”) (emphasis in 
original); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the Constitution’s 
ban on titles of nobility as “the corner stone of republican government; for so long as they 
are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than 
that of the people.”). See generally WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, supra note 25 (describing how republicanism sought to disestablish 
monarchy and aristocracy in politics and culture). 
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it through their efforts in politics.36 The public interest is not 
identical with the private interest of any individual or group. 
People may disagree about what is in the public interest—indeed, 
in a democracy they often do. But they must direct their efforts 
and politics as a whole toward the realization of the public interest 
and the promotion of the res publica.37 Moreover, because 
republicanism is grounded on belief in the common good and the 
public interest, many republican rights include duties which are 
connected to the defense of the republic and republican values. 
The right to keep and bear arms is an example. A purely liberal 
conception of the right to keep and bear arms is a right of 
individual self-defense. But a republican conception of the right 
to keep and bear arms is a public duty of citizens to take up arms 
and, if necessary, to give their lives, to defend the republic against 
tyranny and corruption.38 
Third, republicanism includes a principle of civic equality. 
Because republicanism opposes monarchy, aristocracy, and 
oligarchy, all citizens are equal as citizens and the state may not 
elevate some special class of citizenry above the rest.39 This idea 
is finally enshrined in the text of our Constitution during 
Reconstruction in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
but it is implicit in the concept of republican government.40 The 
prohibition against class and caste legislation, recognized in 
antebellum state constitutional law as well as in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, follows from the republican commitment to the 
equality of citizens. 
Fourth, republicanism includes a principle against 
domination.41 Republican liberty includes formal freedom from 
 
 36. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, in COLLECTED WRITINGS 565 (Eric Foner ed., 
1995) (“RES-PUBLICA, the public affairs, or the public good; or literally translated, the 
public thing . . . refers to what ought to be the character and business of government.”). 
 37. See WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 25, at 55–
56. 
 38. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Melissa Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Colorblindness, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 245, 254 (1997) (arguing that antebellum state courts believed that class 
legislation “threatened true republican government and with it, personal liberty”). 
 41. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 
6, 12 (1997) (arguing that the distinctively republican conception of freedom is non-
domination). Pettit is the most prominent defender of the classical tradition of republican 
liberty in contemporary political philosophy. 
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restraint but it also requires non-domination.42 Mere freedom 
from interference or restraint does not guarantee non-domination 
either in civil society or in politics.43 In republican ideology, 
people who are dominated by others are not free but slaves.44 
Slavery is the condition that occurs when people lack republican 
liberty and cannot rule themselves. 
The republican opposition of slavery to freedom is political 
as well as economic.45 Chattel slavery is only a special case of 
slavery. At time of the American Revolution, the Founding 
generation sometimes spoke of themselves as slaves because they 
had no representation in Parliament.46 The colonists were not 
arguing that they were chattel slaves; rather they argued that they 
lived under the domination of a distant government. 
Fifth, republicanism includes a commitment to self-rule.47 In 
order for the people as a whole to be free, the government must 
respect their freedom. But a mere grant of civil freedom at the 
sufferance of the state is not enough, because the state can take it 
away. Therefore, in order for people to be their own masters, the 
government must respect the rights of the public and it must be 
responsive to the public’s views over time.48 Hence the principle 
 
 42. Id. at 21 (“[T]he conception of freedom as non-domination, not the negative 
conception of freedom as non-interference . . . was embraced among writers in the 
republican tradition.”). 
 43. Id. at 31 (“[T]here may be loss of [republican] liberty without any actual 
interference.”). 
 44. Id. at 31–32 (arguing that republican liberty is premised on the distinction 
between free citizens and those persons, like slaves, who are subject to the arbitrary power 
of another). 
 45. Id. at 32–33, 71–72 (distinguishing political liberty from political slavery—
dependence on others). 
 46. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1481–88 (2013). 
 47. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular 
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 759–
60 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he central pillar of Republican Government . . . is popular 
sovereignty” and that the “deepest spirit of republicanism” is democratic self-rule). 
 48. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (“The genius of Republican 
liberty, seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the 
people; but, that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people . . . .”). 
The idea that the preservation of republican liberty requires popular control of 
government is not central to the classical republicanism of Machiavelli but develops in the 
eighteenth century with the rise of democracy. PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 41, at 
30–31. This is the republicanism of the American Revolution and of the American 
Constitution. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 278–81 
(2005) (describing how republicanism was equated with popular sovereignty in late 
eighteenth-century thought). 
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of non-domination not only guarantees personal liberty; it also 
requires self-rule, and a representative form of government.49 
Sixth, republicanism includes an anti-corruption principle. 
Corruption is the central enemy of republics, and it is a feature of 
both individuals and political systems. Corruption occurs when 
government officials lose their devotion to the public good and 
are no longer responsive to and dependent on public opinion. 
Then officials promote their private interest or the private interest 
of some elite faction or oligarchy over the public interest and the 
public good.50 To maintain a viable republic, one must prevent the 
corruption of the political process. However, the problem of 
corruption is ever-present.51 As time goes on, individuals and 
groups, motivated by self-interest, disregard the common good, 
strive for power, attempt to preserve and extend their status, and 
in general, invent ever new ways to dominate each other.52 
Therefore, in order to preserve a republic, citizens must be 
eternally vigilant in discovering the emerging sources of 
corruption within the political system and to nip them in the bud 
before they have a chance to undermine republican government. 
The best way to guard against corruption is to create institutions 
that will preserve and promote civic virtue and cause individuals 
and groups to work for the common good.53 
 
 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (“[W]e may define a republic to be, 
or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or 
indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their 
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.”). 
 50. PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 41, at 210 (explaining that in the republican 
tradition corruption occurs when people “make their decisions by reference not to 
considerations of the common good but rather to more sectional or private concerns”). 
 51. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 8 (“[R]eliance on the moral virtue 
of their citizens, on their capacity for self-sacrifice and impartiality of judgment, was what 
made republican governments historically so fragile.”). 
 52. PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 41, at 210 (arguing that the basic problem 
of republican governance is to promote resilience and stability in the face of continual 
sources of temptation and corruption). 
 53. Id. at 212 (noting that “however much it may have insisted on the importance of 
virtue,” the republican tradition “has embraced the need . . . for a regime of checks and 
balances.”). The Founding generation also emphasized the development of institutions of 
learning to promote republican virtue. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 476–
77. Dr. Benjamin Rush famously argued that education should “convert men into 
republican machines . . . to perform their parts properly in the great machine of the 
government of the state.” Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic, 
in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 88, 90 (1798) (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 
1947). 
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Seventh, as a result, republicanism includes a principle 
against political self-entrenchment.54 Today’s majority must not 
be able to entrench itself so as to prevent the development of a 
future majority.55 If constitutional structure allows self-
entrenchment, the system will be corrupted, and the people will 
cease to become their own rulers, violating basic principles of 
republican self-government. 
To sum up: republicanism includes seven principles: (1) 
opposition to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy; (2) duties to 
further the public good and act for the public interest; (3) equality 
of citizenship with no special classes, privileges or disabilities that 
might create a new aristocracy; (4) freedom as non-domination; 
(5) individual and political self-rule; (6) a principle against 
corruption (including individual and systemic corruption); and (7) 
a principle against political self-entrenchment. 
As you can see from this list, Barnett captures only a small 
part of these republican themes in his version of Our Republican 
Constitution. In fact, some of these themes are actually in tension 
with his individualist, libertarian conception. 
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing republican in 
Barnett’s account of the Founders’ beliefs. The Founding 
 
 54. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 243 (2011) (“The principle of republican 
government prohibits political incumbents and temporary majorities from trying to 
entrench themselves in power.”); see also Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 44–45 (2004) (arguing 
that many different features of the Constitution are designed to prevent self-
entrenchment); Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and 
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 114–16 (2000) (arguing that the 
Republican Government Clause is designed to prevent political self-entrenchment). 
 55. Political self-entrenchment violates the republican principle of majority rule. See 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton)(“[A] fundamental maxim of republican 
government . . . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.”); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 58 (James Madison) (describing majority rule as “the fundamental principle of free 
government”); 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 212 (Robert A. Rutland & 
Charles P. Hobson eds., 1977) (letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 
1787)) (“[T}he republican principle . . . refers the ultimate decision to the will of the 
majority.”); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp (“[A]bsolute acquiescence in the decisions of the 
majority [is] the vital principle of republics.”). In his Vices of the Political System Madison 
argues that “According to Republican Theory, Right and power being both vested in the 
majority, are held to be synonimous.” James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the 
United States, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 57, 59 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981). But if a 
minority uses superior force and property, “one third only may conquer the remaining two 
thirds,” and “[w]here slavery exists the republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.” 
Id. 
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generation did believe in natural rights. They did believe that the 
purpose (but not the only purpose) of government was to secure 
these rights. Many of the Founders were quite concerned about 
the dangers of direct democracy and they sought to adopt 
structural guarantees of liberty. But Barnett’s account leaves out 
much of the context in which these beliefs were situated. He 
makes the Founders sound too much like late nineteenth-century 
classical liberals or mid-twentieth-century members of the Mont 
Pelerin Society. 
For example, Barnett correctly points out that the Framers 
were worried about the excess of democracy in state legislatures 
following the American Revolution. What he misses is that these 
concerns flowed from eighteenth-century republican ideology—
concerns about civic virtue and devotion to the public good. The 
Founders doubted that state legislatures would uphold “their 
republican responsibility to promote a unitary public interest 
distinguishable from the private and parochial interests of 
individuals.”56 
There is no discussion of corruption or civic virtue in 
Barnett’s account. Indeed, there is no mention of Bailyn, Pocock, 
or Wood in either the text or the footnotes; nor does he discuss 
the vast literature that qualifies and critiques their accounts. He 
opposes republicanism to democracy rather than to monarchy, 
aristocracy and oligarchy—which, for many of the Founders, 
would have been the natural opposites of republican government. 
He emphasizes the protection of natural rights and downplays the 
Founders’ commitment to the public good.57 
This is not an adequate account of the Founding generation’s 
views. Surely they sought to protect individual liberty. But they 
also believed that government had obligations to promote the 
public interest (i.e., the public good).58 Doing so benefited 
 
 56. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 17. 
 57. See, e.g., p. 75 (equating the common good with “the protection of each person’s 
life, liberty, and property”). 
 58. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 25, at 55. It is 
worth emphasizing that although the Founders had many beliefs that we would today call 
liberal, they were not nineteenth-century classical liberals and it is anachronistic to read 
back nineteenth-century classical liberal ideas onto the eighteenth century. William 
Michael Treanor, Taking the Founders Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1035–36 (1988) 
(reviewing WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987)). Jefferson, 
for example, believed in a common good that transcended individual interests and did not 
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individuals in allowing them to pursue happiness, and also 
promoted civic virtue, good citizenship, and the good of all. 
Many of the Founders also believed that it was important for 
governments to maintain a particular political economy in which 
economic inequality was kept within reasonable bounds in order 
to prevent the development of aristocracy and oligarchy.59 The 
Founding generation, Gordon Wood explains, “took for granted 
that a society could not long remain republican if a tiny minority 
controlled most of the wealth and the bulk of the population 
remained dependent servants or poor landless laborers.”60 
In fact, one of the reasons why Founders like Madison and 
Jefferson sought to promote a republic dominated by small 
farmers is that they believed that an agrarian republic would 
prevent vast inequalities of wealth and forestall the inequality and 
corruption they associated with monarchies and aristocracies.61 
The restrictions on primogeniture that Jefferson placed in the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 were designed to break up large 
landholding estates and prevent the growth of economic and 
hereditary aristocracy. Similar reforms occurred at the state level. 
Gordon Wood notes that “all the states in the decades following 
the Revolution abolished both entail and primogeniture where 
they existed.”62 The justifications were republican. As the North 
Carolina legislature explained in a 1784 statute, these ancient 
legal doctrines worked “only to raise the wealth and importance 
of particular families and individuals, giving them an unequal and 
undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold instances the 
source of great contention and injustice.”63 Reforming the laws 
governing the most important source of wealth at the time—
ownership of land—would “tend to promote that equality of 
property which is of the spirit and principle of a genuine 
republic.”64 
 
celebrate the unrestrained pursuit of economic self-interest. Joyce Appleby, 
Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20, 33 (1986). 
 59. See JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY 
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2017). 
 60. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 8. 
 61. See DOUGLASS G. ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN 
DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS FARMER 52 
(1964 republished 2000). 
 62. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 498. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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When Jefferson and Madison created the first Republican 
Party, the name reflected the belief that the policies of the 
Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, were pushing the country 
toward monarchy, aristocracy, and corruption, while the 
Republicans were the true inheritors of the virtuous politics of the 
Revolution.65 Madison explained that his new party would be 
called “Republican” because it sought to prevent the growth of 
aristocracy and privilege.66 Whether or not it is consistent with 
Barnett’s conception of natural rights of property, the use of 
government to proactively forestall the creation of vast 
inequalities of wealth is characteristically republican.67 
Years later, when the Republican Party was formed in 1854, 
its founders sought to resurrect several of Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s ideas about political economy. The name 
“Republican” was chosen not because the new party was 
particularly opposed to direct democracy, but because it opposed 
the Slave Power that had dominated American politics for more 
than a generation. In the antebellum South, a small number of 
plantation owners owned almost all of the wealth in the region 
through their control over land and slaves. Republicans feared 
that these men were attempting to use their economic and 
political power to impose a new oligarchy on Americans.68 The 
Republican demand for “free land” and “free soil” sought 
equitable distribution of western land; Republicans argued that 
the plantation system allowed wealthy slave owners to buy up 
ever more property, crowding out small farmers and destroying 
their economic independence.69 Once in power, Republicans 
sought to prevent the accumulation of huge, landed estates and to 
ensure economic independence for a broad spectrum of 
 
 65. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 151–52; ADAIR, INTELLECTUAL 
ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 61. 
 66. James Madison, A Candid State of Parties, NAT. GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 1792. 
 67. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY xii, 4, 9 (2015). 
 68. Id. at 6–7; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY 
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 87–91 (1995). 
 69. RICHARDSON, supra note 67, at 3–4; Andrew Shankman, Introduction: Conflict 
for a Continent: Land, Labor, and the State in the First American Republic, in THE WORLD 
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: LAND, LABOR AND THE CONFLICT FOR 
A CONTINENT 17 (Andrew Shankman ed., 2014); see also FONER, supra note 68, at 46–50, 
59–60, 63–65 (1995) (describing Republican and Free Soil critiques of Southern society, 
which blamed the expansion of slavery for impoverishing whites who did not own slaves, 
undermining social mobility, and perpetuating aristocracy). 
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Americans—regardless of color—through distribution of 
government-owned lands in the West and the creation of land-
grant colleges and universities.70 One will find none of these ideas 
in Barnett’s description of Our Republican Constitution, and the 
distributional concerns of historical republicanism—and the early 
Republican Party—are in some tension with his account of the 
constitutional purposes of government. 
Barnett’s description of republicanism, in short, is a 
remarkable act of historiographical chutzpah. He takes a few 
features of republican ideology, staples them onto classical 
liberalism, and then calls the result “republicanism.” It is a little 
like creating a fantasy baseball team that takes a few of the 
Yankees’ best players, adds most of the Boston Red Sox, and calls 
the team “the New York Yankees.” You can call your fantasy 
baseball team whatever you like. But the people in New York and 
Boston, at least, will not be fooled. 
Of course, we no longer live in the Founders’ world. In 
today’s political context, people often oppose republics to direct 
democracies, and they associate republicanism with protection 
against majoritarian excess. So the title of the book will likely 
communicate Barnett’s message more directly to a modern 
audience that knows little about the ideology of the Founders. 
Barnett could have called his book “Our Lockean Constitution,” 
or “Our Natural Rights Constitution,” or “Our Classical Liberal 
Constitution,” but these titles might not have sold as well to a 
general audience, or—in the case of the last one—were already 
taken.71 In fact, the title “Our Republican Constitution” was 
already taken. A book with that name was written in 2005 by 
Adam Tomkins, a British public law scholar.72 Tomkins argues 
that despite the persistence of the monarchy, the U.K. has 
essentially become a republic and should be governed according 
 
 70. RICHARDSON, supra note 67, at 21, 34–36. See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 
75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (granting settlers 160 acres of government land); Land-Grant 
Agricultural and Mechanical College Act of 1862 (Morrill Act), 12 Stat. 503 (1862) 
(establishing system for land-grant colleges and universities to teach agriculture and 
engineering); see also Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule, supra note 7, at 40 (1990) (noting 
how the distributive goals of early Republicans aimed at securing the economic 
independence necessary for republican government). 
 71. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE 
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014). 
 72. ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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to republican principles. His account of republicanism largely 
tracks the historical account I have described in this Essay. 
V. REPUBLICANISM IN THE PRESENT 
What is at stake in recalling the historical republican 
tradition? First, the historical tradition of republicanism contrasts 
markedly with Barnett’s version of Our Republican Constitution. 
It is also not identical with Barnett’s “Democratic Constitution.” 
Therefore the choice he offers between the “Republican” and 
“Democratic” constitutions is a false choice. 
Second, the historical republican tradition—or parts of it, at 
any rate—is a more attractive account of America’s constitutional 
values than Barnett’s version of “Our Democratic Constitution,” 
which largely serves as a rhetorical foil for his preferred version 
of the Constitution.73  
Third, the Founders were neither simply republican nor 
liberal. They were creative thinkers who employed many different 
strains of thought to solve the problems of their day. Therefore, if 
our goal is to offer a sympathetic account of the American 
constitutional tradition that we might use today, we should take 
the best elements of both traditions. We cannot simply leave 
republicanism on the cutting room floor. 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the historical 
republican tradition may be far more relevant to understanding 
our current predicament than Barnett’s classical liberal account, 
because it speaks directly to fears of growing oligarchy, 
aristocracy, and corruption, and because it values a public good 
that is separate from the ambitions and strivings of individuals and 
groups. Viewed sympathetically, the historical republican 
tradition helps explain many of the contemporary concerns of 
liberals and conservatives, populists and progressives; we can find 
its themes in both the contemporary Democratic and Republican 
parties. 
 
 73. I say “parts of it” because the historical tradition has both conservative and 
radical/egalitarian versions and elements, as described supra text at notes 5–8. Moreover, 
as noted above, liberal and republican elements can balance and critique each other. The 
best parts of the liberal tradition, for example, can help us critique inegalitarian features 
of the republican tradition: its complacency about slavery, property qualifications for 
voting, and the domination of women within families. 
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Start with conservatives and Republicans. Many of them are 
deeply concerned about the promoting the public good (especially 
social and religious conservatives). They are also concerned about 
corruption in government, which they identify with liberal and 
secular elites. At the same time, many conservative Republicans 
also believe that establishment Republicans and Republican elites 
have repeatedly treated them like dupes and sold them out to 
benefit the economic interests of the wealthy. 
Meanwhile, many liberals and Democrats believe that 
government has been hijacked by an economic oligarchy that has 
used government to exacerbate inequalities of wealth, to enrich 
itself at the expense of ordinary Americans, and to block sensible 
reforms in the public interest. 
Both people on the left and on the right, in short, have come 
to the conclusion that government is for sale, that the political 
system is rigged against them, and that politicians are being 
bought and sold by powerful economic interests who have formed 
a new oligarchy and aristocracy. The wealthiest and most 
powerful people and businesses have entrenched their allies in 
power so that ordinary people can’t catch a break. This economic 
and cultural aristocracy has turned government into a device for 
protecting its own wealth and political power, and shifted the 
economic risks of globalization and change onto the middle class 
and the poor. There are both left-wing and right-wing versions of 
these concerns, with somewhat different villains and culprits. Yet 
the left- and right-wing versions of this complaint have many 
similarities. 
These concerns about aristocracy, oligarchy, self-
entrenchment, and corruption have led to angry populist 
mobilizations, with groups on both the left and the right 
demanding their country back. The historical republican tradition 
is of two minds about these developments. On the one hand, these 
protests speak to core republican concerns. On the other, they 
create the real risk that our politics will fracture into powerful 
factions that are uninterested in promoting the public good, or 
that will degenerate into authoritarianism, despotism, and 
tyranny. 
The historical republican tradition teaches us that we must 
organize our politics to preserve a broad middle class of citizens 
who have a stake in governance, and that we must work 
continuously to prevent corruption, oligarchy, and political self-
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entrenchment from undermining our politics. Because change in 
political and economic circumstances is constant, we must be 
eternally vigilant in asking where the sources of oligarchy and 
aristocracy now exist in our system, and rethink the problems and 
obligations of republican government anew. 
Barnett himself might agree with many of these sentiments, 
although he and I might disagree about the particular sources of 
the problem and about the most appropriate solutions. But his 
version of Our Republican Constitution—which is essentially an 
idealization of nineteenth-century classical liberalism—seems to 
me altogether too thin to recognize and meet these contemporary 
concerns. By insisting that the central, if not sole, purpose of 
government is to protect natural rights—including, most 
prominently, the right to acquire and accumulate property—his 
account seems to talk past what concerns many people today 
about our political and constitutional system, not only on the left, 
but also on the right. In fact, Barnett’s account of the purposes of 
government actually disables us from talking about the problems 
of political economy that the historical theory of republicanism 
was centrally concerned with. 
Barnett’s book was designed both to promote and intervene 
in a particular kind of political conversation about the country and 
the Constitution. Barnett states candidly that “Our Republican 
Constitution will not be restored in our two-party system until one 
of the two major political parties embraces it as a central plank of 
its political platform” (p. 252). And he is equally clear about 
which party that would be: “The natural home of the Republican 
Constitution is the modern Republican Party” (p. 252). 
Accordingly, Barnett hoped that the Republican Party would 
shed its cronyism and become a party devoted to the restoration 
of Our Republican Constitution. Thoughtful politicians like 
Senators Rand Paul and Mike Lee might forge a new Republican 
coalition devoted to a rigorous constitutional conservatism (pp. 
252-253). This would present a clear choice between a Republican 
party devoted to libertarianism and limited government and a 
Democratic Party committed to progressive social democracy and 
environmentalism (p. 253). While this book was being written, 
there was a genuine possibility—at least among conservative 
intellectuals—that this development might occur and that it would 
frame the 2016 election. 
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Yet by the middle of 2016, Americans seem to be having a 
very different political conversation about the country and the 
Constitution. The political base of the Republican Party—as 
opposed to its political elites, wealthy donors, and intellectuals—
seems remarkably uninterested in Barnett’s vision. The party’s 
2016 presidential nominee, Donald Trump, cares little for civil 
liberties and even less for limited government. Indeed, to the 
extent that Trump has any consistent positions at all, he seems to 
stand for the opposite of everything that Barnett holds dear. 
Trump is a nightmare version of Barnett’s Democratic 
Constitution, not because he is a good government progressive, 
but because he is at heart a Schmittian. In Carl Schmitt’s vision of 
popular sovereignty, the dictator rules through a collective shout 
or affirmation by the mass of the people.74 In the same way, 
Trump insists that he speaks for the people collectively—he calls 
them a great “silent majority”75—and he asserts that he is 
authorized to act because the great mass of the people are behind 
him. The irony is that at the very moment Barnett’s book is 
published, the Republican Party risks becoming the natural home 
not of Our Republican Constitution but Our Schmittian 
Constitution. 
Just as important as the rise of Trumpism, however, is a 
remarkable shift in political conversation on both the left and the 
right. Both sides of the political spectrum seem to be raising 
historical republican themes—concerning corruption, oligarchy, 
and abandonment of the public good. This conversation is 
sometimes ill-formed, ugly, and even idiotic, but it raises many of 
the central questions that historical republicanism was concerned 
with. How can we restore public virtue and devotion to the public 
good? How can we restore trust in public and private institutions 
that have proven themselves corrupt and have been undermined 
by the naked pursuit of self-interest and self-dealing? How can we 
prevent our government from being taken over by new forms of 
oligarchy and aristocracy? How can we keep the republic—the res 
publica, the public thing that belongs to us all—viable in a world 
 
 74. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 131 (1928) (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 
2008). 
 75. Sam Sanders, Trump Champions the ‘Silent Majority,’ But What Does That Mean 
in 2016?, NPR (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/22/463884201/trump-
champions-the-silent-majority-but-what-does-that-mean-in-2016. 
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of globalization, threats to our national security abroad, and self-
seeking hucksterism at home? 
In this swirling conversation of hope, despair, anger, and 
frustration, Barnett’s attempt to restate the natural rights 
tradition seems curiously beside the point. The only party that 
might put his ideas into practice has imploded and broken into a 
war between angry populists and establishment Republicans 
desperate to maintain their political influence. For the moment, 
at least, the proud Republican Party has been taken over by an 
anti-republican demagogue. For classical liberals like Barnett, the 
only hope is that Trump—in order to keep peace within his 
party—will appoint judges whose views are closer to those of 
constitutional conservatives than to his own. One suspects that 
this was not the world Barnett imagined when he sat down to 
write his book. 
Events are moving quickly, however. Just as we cannot make 
sense of our political traditions by neglecting or suppressing 
historical republicanism, so too we cannot make sense of them by 
neglecting or suppressing the historical traditions of liberalism, 
including Barnett’s classical liberal brand. Whether or not the 
Republican Party abandons its libertarian promise for a 
revanchist populism, this book will remain a statement of a 
powerful dissenting tradition within American conservatism. One 
writes books not simply for the moment, but for an indefinite 
future. Even though they may be mislabeled as “republican,” 
history is far from finished with the ideas in this book. 
 
